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JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Robert E. Gordon and Justice Garcia concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
O P I N I O N
¶ 1 Plaintiff Gregg Lansing sued defendant Southwest Airlines Company for negligent
supervision of its employee.  Plaintiff alleged that he notified defendant that its employee was
threatening and harassing him but defendant failed to supervise the employee and take steps to
stop his misconduct.  The alleged misconduct included the employee's use of defendant's
computer, Internet and telephone facilities to send harassing and threatening e-mails and text
messages.  
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¶ 2 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant based on a finding that
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) (47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000))
afforded defendant immunity from plaintiff's claims that arose from the e-mails and text
messages.  Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the CDA was inapplicable because his cause of action
did not treat defendant as the publisher or speaker of the offensive e-mails and text messages but,
rather, was based on defendant's failure to supervise its employee after defendant had received
notice of the employee's misconduct.
¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 4 I.  BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In August 2006, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant Southwest
Airlines Company, alleging direct negligence and vicarious liability/ratification.  Defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)) for failure to properly plead a cause of action.  
¶ 6 In June 2007, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, which alleged that defendant: 
failed to adequately supervise its employee, Thomas McGrew; allowed McGrew to use
defendant's computer, Internet and telephone facilities to threaten and harass plaintiff; and failed
to take appropriate disciplinary action against McGrew despite notice from plaintiff about
McGrew's misconduct.  
¶ 7 In February 2008, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-
1005(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(e) (West 2008)), asserting, inter alia, that section 230
of the CDA preempted plaintiff's state law claim and gave defendant immunity from liability for
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plaintiff's alleged negligence claim.
¶ 8 In October 2008, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
finding that defendant was afforded immunity under the CDA for the claims arising out of
McGrew's use of the Internet because defendant was a provider or user of an interactive computer
service and would be deemed the publisher of the harassing e-mails and text messages at issue in
plaintiff's cause of action.  The trial court noted, however, that the issue of defendant's liability
for the harassing telephone calls remained pending.
¶ 9 In December 2008, defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-
1005(e) of the Code, asserting, inter alia, that plaintiff could not prove that McGrew made any
threatening telephone calls from one of defendant's telephones or while under the supervision of
defendant.
¶ 10 In June 2009, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, which sought damages
against defendant based on its alleged negligent failure–despite repeated notice from plaintiff–to
stop McGrew, who was a flight attendant and supervisor employed by defendant, from using his
position with defendant and defendant's resources to threaten and harass plaintiff and his friends,
family members and professional colleagues.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged that McGrew met
plaintiff's friend on a Southwest Airlines flight in June of 2004 and then perceived plaintiff as a
rival to McGrew's relationship with that friend.  McGrew, as defendant's employee, had access to
defendant's offices, network, computer terminals, work stations, telephone facilities, customer
data information, and business calling cards, and a cell phone provided by defendant.  
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¶ 11 Plaintiff also alleged that McGrew, from June 2004 through August 2006, used his access
to defendant's resources to make harassing telephone calls and send over 1,000 harassing and
threatening text messages or e-mails to plaintiff.  According to plaintiff, McGrew threatened that,
as a supervisor, he knew when people made reservations on his flights and would prevent
plaintiff and his family members from flying by placing them on terrorism "no fly" lists with
defendant and its affiliated airlines.  Further, McGrew emphasized his position and authority with
defendant, threatened to "haunt" and "completely ruin" plaintiff, and asserted that no one would
believe any complaints plaintiff might lodge against McGrew.  As time progressed, McGrew's
messages and e-mails became increasingly violent, mentioned plaintiff's family members by
name, and were transmitted directly to plaintiff's family members and professional colleagues.  
¶ 12 In addition, plaintiff alleged that in April of 2005 and January, March, April and May of
2006, he contacted defendant's customer relations department, reported McGrew's harassment
and requested that defendant take measures to stop McGrew's wrongful conduct and harassment. 
Despite that notice, however, McGrew's wrongful conduct and harassment continued until his
employment with defendant was terminated on August 22, 2006.  Plaintiff asserted that, as a
result of McGrew's conduct and defendant's failure to adequately supervise him, plaintiff
changed his telephone number several times in an attempt to avoid McGrew's harassment; was
ostracized by his family members, friends and professional colleagues; and suffered
embarrassment, humiliation, distress and anxiety.
¶ 13 In July 2009, defendant filed a motion under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
615 (West 2008)) to strike certain allegations and dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint. 
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Defendant argued that plaintiff ignored the trial court's October 2008 ruling that the CDA
preempted plaintiff's claims that arose from the e-mails or text messages McGrew allegedly sent
to plaintiff.  Defendant also requested sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff.
Feb. 1, 1994), asserting that plaintiff knew his claim of negligent supervision was neither well-
grounded in fact nor supported by existing law and included allegations that disregarded the trial
court's October 2008 ruling concerning preemption under the CDA. 
¶ 14 In August 2009, plaintiff moved the trial court to reconsider its October 2008 ruling about
defendant's immunity under the CDA.  Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that no Illinois state or federal
court interpreted the immunity afforded by the CDA so broadly and plaintiff's negligent
supervision cause of action did not treat defendant as a publisher of McGrew's e-mails and texts. 
¶ 15 In September 2009, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, granted
defendant's motion to strike and dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint, and denied
defendant's motion for Rule 137 sanctions.  The trial court granted plaintiff leave to file a third
amended complaint.
¶ 16 In November 2009, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, which made the same
allegations that were set forth in his second amended complaint.  In the third amended complaint,
plaintiff referenced and attached additional exhibits and emphasized certain allegations
concerning McGrew's statements about his employment and position with defendant.  Plaintiff
elected to stand on his third amended complaint.
¶ 17 In April 2010, the trial court held that its October 2008 grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant with regard to the CDA stood as the trial court's ruling on plaintiff's third
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amended complaint.  Accordingly, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff on the third amended complaint.  The trial court determined that
there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of its summary judgment ruling, and
plaintiff timely appealed.
¶ 18 II.  ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Before addressing the merits of plaintiff's appeal, we address defendant's argument that
plaintiff has failed to preserve for review his argument that his lawsuit is outside the purview of
the CDA because it is not based on treating defendant as the publisher of the offensive material
but, rather, is based on defendant's failure to act on plaintiff's complaints about its employee's
misconduct.  
¶ 20 Defendant's argument lacks merit.  According to the record, plaintiff's amended
complaints clearly asserted as the basis of his negligent supervision claim defendant's failure to
supervise its employee and stop his campaign against plaintiff after plaintiff had notified
defendant of the employee's harassing and threatening conduct.  Plaintiff also argued this claim
to the trial court below in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment.  Contrary to
defendant's assertion on appeal, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration did not raise a new
argument but, rather, reiterated the basis of his claim against defendant as pled in his amended
complaint and argued that the trial court erroneously extended the CDA's immunity provision to
bar plaintiff's pled claim.  
¶ 21 We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment.  Anderson v. Alberto-
Culver USA, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1110 (2000).  Summary judgement is a "drastic means
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of disposing of litigation and therefore should be allowed only when the right of the moving
party is clear and free from doubt."  Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986).  "In determining
a summary judgment motion, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions on file must
be construed strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent."  Anderson,
317 Ill. App. 3d at 1110.  Reversal of a grant of summary judgment is warranted where, on
review, a material issue of fact or an inaccurate interpretation of law exists.  Id.
¶ 22 In a cause of action for negligent supervision, the plaintiff must establish that (1) the
employer had a duty to supervise its employee; (2) the employer negligently supervised its
employee; and (3) such negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.  Mueller v.
Community Consolidated School District 54, 287 Ill. App. 3d 337, 342-43 (1997).  The existence
of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide, and the issues of breach and proximate
cause are questions of fact for the trier of fact, provided that there is a genuine issue of material
fact regarding those issues.  Anderson, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1111.
¶ 23 Defendant contends that subsection 230(c)(1) of the CDA (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000))
renders it immune from liability in plaintiff's negligent supervision cause of action.  The trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the CDA protected
defendant from liability as a matter of law.  Plaintiff argues that any immunity under subsection
230(c)(1) of the CDA does not apply to his negligent supervision cause of action and that, even if
it did, defendant does not meet the terms to qualify for such immunity. 
¶ 24 Section 230 of the CDA, which is entitled "Protection for private blocking and screening
of offensive material," protects certain Internet-based actors from certain kinds of lawsuits.  47
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U.S.C. § 230 (2000).  When Congress enacted section 230 of the CDA, it found that the rapidly
developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services flourished, to the benefit of
all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation and Americans increasingly relied on
interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural and entertainment services.  47
U.S.C. § 230(a) (2000).  While Congress sought to promote the continued development of the
Internet and preserve the free market that existed on it, Congress also wanted to encourage the
development of technology that maximized user control over the information that individuals,
families and schools received on the Internet, including technology that empowered parents to
restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.  47 U.S.C. §
230(b) (2000).  
¶ 25 Accordingly, Congress provided, under subsection (c), which is entitled "Protection for
'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material," as follows:
"(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability  
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of–
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material
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that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make
available to information content providers or others
the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1)."  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
(2000).
An interactive computer service provider must, when it enters an agreement with a customer for
the provision of interactive computer service, notify the customer that parental control
protections are commercially available.  47 U.S.C. § 230(d) (2000).  
¶ 26 Concerning its effect on other laws, section 230 of the CDA shall not be construed to: 
impair the enforcement of any federal criminal statute and certain specified federal statutes that
concern the prohibition of obscene or harassing telephone calls, the restriction of children's
access to harmful material on the World Wide Web, obscenity, and sexual exploitation of
children (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2000)); limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual
property (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2000)); limit the application of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000)) or any similar state law (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4)
(2000)); or prevent any state from enforcing any state law that is consistent with section 230 (47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2000)).  Furthermore, "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability
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may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with [section 230]."  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(3) (2000).  
¶ 27 "The term 'interactive computer service' means any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions."  47 U.S.C.              
§ 230(f)(2) (2000).  
¶ 28 "The term 'information content provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service."  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2000).
¶ 29 When interpreting a federal statute, state courts should generally follow the decisions of
federal courts to ensure that the statutory scheme is uniformly applied.  Wilson v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 187 Ill. 2d 369, 374 (1999).  When federal cases conflict or are inconsistent
with respect to a given proposition, and no United States Supreme Court case directly addresses
the issue, we will follow the decision that is more "reasonable and logical" and more consistent
with both the statutory purpose and Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 381-82.  Also, because
Illinois federal district courts are bound by Seventh Circuit precedent, we tend to give greater
weight to Seventh Circuit cases to "avoid[] the anomalous situation of two contrary results being
obtainable depending on where the case is filed in Illinois."  Id. at 383 ("[W]ere we to adopt a
rule contrary to that of the Seventh Circuit, *** the viability of a claim [under a given federal
statute] could turn on whether the action was filed in federal or state court.").  These are not
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unyielding rules, however; where there is a split of authority among the federal circuit courts of
appeal and the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, we are not required to follow federal
cases, even those from the Seventh Circuit, that appear wrongly decided.  Bowman v. American
River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 91 (2005). 
¶ 30 In analyzing the scope of section 230(c)(1), the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive
unless the literal application of the statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters.  See United States v. Balint, 201 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2000).  "We
look beyond the express language of a statute only where such language is ambiguous, or where a
literal interpretation would lead to absurd results or thwart the goals of the statutory scheme." 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1995).  A
court's interpretation is guided not just by a single sentence or clause, but by the language of the
whole law and its policy.  Balint, 201 F.3d at 932-33.
¶ 31 Defendant contends that it is entitled to immunity under the CDA from plaintiff's cause of
action because (1) defendant is afforded broad immunity as a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (ICS); (2) plaintiff's cause of action treats defendant as the publisher or speaker
of the offensive communications; and (3) a third party, McGrew, authored the offensive
communications.  
¶ 32 A.  Providers or Users of an Interactive Computer Service
¶ 33 First, we consider whether defendant qualifies as a provider or user of an ICS, which term
is defined in section 230(f)(2) of the CDA.  Plaintiff argues that defendant is a commercial air
travel provider, not an Internet service provider, and when Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, it
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did not intend to include within the concept of an ICS employers who gave their employees
access to the Internet for the purpose of their work.  In 1996, employers did not utilize the
Internet in their day-to-day operations, and the language of the CDA, according to plaintiff,
indicates that it was originally tailored for traditional providers of Internet and e-mail services,
such as AOL, CompuServe, Prodigy and Earthlink.  
¶ 34 Defendant responds that the history surrounding the CDA indicates that Congress
intended to protect all Internet service providers, including employers because they provide a
"front end to the Internet."  Defendant cites a statement in the Congressional Record that was
made when section 230 was offered as an amendment to the proposed CDA.  Specifically,
Representative Christopher Cox explained that the amendment would accomplish two things.  In
addition to establishing the policy that Congress did not want the federal government to regulate
Internet content, the amendment would also:
"protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who
provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to screen indecency
and offensive material for their customers.  It will protect them from taking on
liability."  141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, at 8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Cox).
Defendant also cites the conference report, which commented that the Good Samaritan
protections from civil liability in section 230 of the CDA applied to all interactive computer
services, "including non-subscriber systems such as those operated by many businesses for
employee use."  H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.
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A.N. 124, 208. 
¶ 35 The parties' arguments concerning the term Internet service provider, which is neither
defined nor mentioned in section 230 of the CDA, are irrelevant to the issue before this court. 
The proper focus of the analysis is whether defendant is a user or provider of an interactive
computer service as defined in section 230(f)(2) of the CDA.  See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003).
¶ 36 We find that, under the plain language of the statute and its broad definition of an ICS, an
employer like defendant qualifies as a provider or user of an ICS because defendant uses an
information system or service that multiple users, like defendant's employees, use to access the
Internet.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2000).  See also Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 52
Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 389-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (corporate employer that gave its employees
Internet access was an ICS provider); Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772,
777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (library providing Internet access to the public by use of computers
qualified as an ICS provider or user).
¶ 37 B.  Subsection 230(c)(1) and Broad Immunity
¶ 38 Defendant contends that subsection 230(c)(1) of the CDA grants an ICS user or provider
broad immunity from any potential liability that is derived from content posted on or transmitted
over the Internet by a third party.  Defendant's contention has support in other state courts and
federal circuits.  See Delfino, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 390 ("it is clear that immunity under section
230" applies to a variety of tort claims other than defamation); Universal Communication
Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (In light of section 230's policy
13
1-10-1164
concerns, the court found that "section 230 immunity should be broadly construed."); Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing section 230 as creating a "broad
immunity"); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. American Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir.
2000) (section 230 "creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold
computer service providers liable for information originating with a third party");  Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328-30 (4th Cir. 1997) ("By its plain language, § 230 creates
a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service.").  
¶ 39 Other courts, however, disagree with or question the proposition that subsection          
230 (c)(1) provides such broad immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.  City of
Chicago v. Stubhub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) ("subsection (c)(1) does not create
an 'immunity' of any kind"); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Looking at the text [of subsection (c)(1)], it appears clear that neither this subsection nor any
other declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content ***.");
Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
669-71 (7th Cir. 2008) (questioning whether subsection 230(c)(1) creates any form of immunity);
accord Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).  
¶ 40 We agree with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit that section 230(c) "as a whole cannot
be understood" as granting blanket immunity to an ICS user or provider from any civil cause of
action that involves content posted on or transmitted over the Internet by a third party. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 669, 671.  Neither section 230's title ("Protection for private blocking
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and screening of offensive material") nor subsection (c)'s caption ("Protection for 'Good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material") suggests that section 230 provides
immunity for a negligence action based upon the defendant's failure to supervise its employee.  
The Seventh Circuit noted that the caption of section 230(c) refers simply to protections for those
who block and screen offensive material and the text of subsection 230(c)(1) does not mention
immunity or any synonym.  GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659-60.  Moreover, the statutory goal of
encouraging the filtering and screening of offensive material would be undermined if ICS users
and providers could expect immunity even if they were indifferent to the content of the
information they hosted or transmitted.  GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659-60 (it is unlikely that, when
Congress enacted the CDA to protect Good Samaritans from liability for filtering offensive
content, Congress also intended to grant broad immunity to ICS users or providers that did not
screen any third-party content whatsoever).  See also Chicago Lawyer's Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 695-96 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(Congress enacted 230(c) to overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which held that the provider of an online messaging board
became a publisher when it deleted some offensive third-party postings and, thus, was subject to
publisher's liability for the defamatory postings it failed to remove).  
¶ 41 Defendant's interpretation of subsection 230(c)(1) expands its scope beyond its language. 
We, like the Seventh Circuit, read subsection 230(c)(1) to do exactly what it says, and what it
says is that an ICS user or provider like defendant must not "be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by" someone else.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2000); see
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Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 671.  Accordingly, because subsection 230(c)(1) limits who may be
called the publisher or speaker of information that appears online, it could foreclose any liability
that depends on deeming the ICS user or provider a publisher or speaker, like a cause of action
for defamation, obscenity, or copyright infringement.  See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659-60;
Stubhub!, Inc., 624 F.3d at 366.
¶ 42 The CDA was not enacted to be a complete shield for ICS users or providers against any
and all state law torts that involve the use of the Internet.  Such an overly broad interpretation of
the CDA is inconsistent with the statutory purpose to encourage the restriction of objectionable
or inappropriate online material.  Moreover, such a grant of blanket immunity would lead to the
anomalous result that occurred in the trial court below, i.e., plaintiff was allowed to proceed with
his negligent supervision claim against defendant where the evidence of the employee's
threatening and harassing conduct arose from telephone calls, but that same cause of action was
barred where the evidence of the very same wrongful conduct arose from e-mails and text
messages.  The CDA does not bar plaintiff's cause of action simply because defendant's employee
used the Internet access provided by defendant as one vehicle to harass and threaten plaintiff. 
¶ 43 For purposes of defendant's summary judgment motion, the parties agree that defendant's
employee McGrew created the e-mails and text messages that were sent over the Internet.  We
conclude, accordingly, that subsection 230(c)(1) of the CDA merely entitles defendant not to be
"the publisher or speaker" of those e-mails and text messages.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(3)
(2000).  The remaining issue, then, is whether plaintiff's cause of action treats defendant as the
publisher or speaker of the offensive information.
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¶ 44 C.  Treatment as a Publisher or Speaker
¶ 45 We find that section 230(c) of the CDA does not apply to plaintiff's negligent supervision
cause of action because any issue concerning whether defendant acted like a publisher or speaker
of the offensive material is irrelevant to plaintiff's pled claim.  Plaintiff's negligent supervision
cause of action does not require publishing or speaking as a critical element, and holding
defendant liable for its failure to supervise its employee after defendant had received notice of
the employee's wrongful conduct does not treat defendant as if it were the publisher or speaker of
the alleged e-mails and texts.  
¶ 46 Under the CDA, "what matters is not the name of the cause of action–defamation versus
negligence versus intentional infliction of emotional distress–what matters is whether the cause
of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the 'publisher or speaker' of
content provided by another."  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02.  In Barnes, the plaintiff sued
Yahoo!, Inc., an Internet service provider, for negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel
based on Yahoo's failure to remove indecent profiles of the plaintiff that were posted on Yahoo's
Web site by the plaintiff's former boyfriend.  The court held that the CDA barred the plaintiff's
negligent undertaking claim because it was based on Yahoo's failed undertaking to remove or
depublish the offensive profiles and, thus, was based on a violated duty that was derived from
Yahoo's conduct as a publisher.  Id. at 1103.  However, the court held that the CDA did not bar
the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim because it was based on a violated duty that sprang from
an enforceable promise Yahoo had breached, i.e., Yahoo's promise to the plaintiff to promptly
remove the offensive material from its Web site.  Id. at 1107-08.
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¶ 47 Here, the duty that plaintiff alleges defendant has violated is derived from defendant's
duty to supervise McGrew's conduct as an employee of defendant.  Defendant's duty to supervise
its employee is distinct from any conduct like editing, monitoring or removing offensive content
published on the Internet.  Contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, plaintiff's theory of
liability is not based on defendant allowing McGrew access to the Internet to publish
inappropriate and defamatory electronic messages and then failing to either monitor his messages
or prevent them from being sent or somehow remove them.  Rather, plaintiff, seeks to hold
defendant liable for failing to investigate plaintiff's complaint about McGrew's wrongful conduct,
reprimand him, and timely suspend or terminate his employment.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged
that he repeatedly notified defendant that McGrew was using his position of employment with
defendant and defendant's equipment and resources to harass and threaten plaintiff and his
family, friends, and professional colleagues. Clearly, the duty plaintiff alleges defendant violated
is not derived from any behavior by defendant that is similar to publishing or speaking. 
¶ 48 To support his argument that plaintiff's claim is barred by the CDA, defendant cites
Delfino, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376.  In Delfino, the plaintiffs received anonymous threatening
messages that were sent over the Internet and were eventually traced by the FBI to an employee
of the defendant, a technology corporation.  The defendant cooperated with the FBI to determine
the origin of the offensive communications, conducted its own internal investigation to determine
whether its employee had made any cyberthreats to the plaintiffs, placed the employee on
administrative leave while the matter was investigated, and then terminated the employee when
he admitted that he may have sent offensive messages by logging onto the Internet at work.  Id. at
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385.  The plaintiffs sued the defendant and the employee, alleging intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, ratification, respondeat superior, and negligent
supervision/retention of an employee.  The reviewing court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the defendant was entitled to CDA
immunity because it was an ICS and the plaintiffs' cause of action treated the defendant as the
speaker or publisher of its employee's cyberthreats.  Id. at 392.  
¶ 49 The Delfino court also held that, "even if plaintiffs' claims were not barred under section
230(c)(1)" of the CDA, summary judgment was nonetheless proper because the plaintiffs failed
to make a prima facie showing on their claims against the defendant.  Id.  Relevant to the appeal
before us, the Delfino court found the plaintiffs' negligent supervision theory of liability failed
because the existence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiffs was doubtful where there was no
evidence that the employee's cyberthreats were in any way connected with his employment.  Id.
at 398.  Furthermore, the facts did not suggest that the defendant knew or had reason to suspect
that its employee was engaged in improper on-the-job conduct.  Id. at 399.  In addition, there was
no evidence that the employee used the defendant's computer system to threaten the plaintiffs
after the defendant conducted its internal investigation.  Id.  
¶ 50 As discussed above, we do not follow the holdings of the courts that have interpreted
section 230(c)(1) as granting blanket immunity to an ICS user or provider from any cause of
action involving content posted on or transmitted over the Internet by a third party.  In Delfino,
the court's analysis of the scope of immunity under section 230(c)(1) was primarily confined to
the context of the plaintiffs' intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims,
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which were similar to claims for defamation and did seek to hold the defendant liable for conduct
derived from the publication of the offensive information.  Accordingly, Delfino's conclusion that
the CDA's immunity bars a negligent supervision claim lacks analysis and is not persuasive. 
Finally, Delfino's alternative analysis concerning the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie
showing to support their negligent supervision claim is not relevant to the appeal before us.  The
facts pled by plaintiff do not treat defendant as the publisher of McGrew's communications, and
plaintiff has alleged that defendant, unlike the employer in Delfino, failed to take any action to
address its employee's threats and misuse of his position of employment after plaintiff had
informed defendant about the employee's misconduct. 
¶ 51 Subsection (c)(1) of the CDA limits who may be called the publisher of information that
appears online, and plaintiff's negligent supervision cause of action does not depend on who
published McGrew's offensive information.  Consequently section 230(c) of the CDA does not
bar plaintiff's cause of action.
¶ 52 III.  CONCLUSION
¶ 53 We reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand
for further proceedings.
¶ 54 Reversed and remanded. 
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